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STRATEGIC AIR MOBILITY: MEETING THE DEMANDS OF THE 21 ST CENTURY
The man who is too set to change is dead already. The funeral is a mere detail.
Henry Ford
PURPOSE
No policy is static. All policies, whether in the household, a business, or the United States government, are subject to review and revision. This paper will deal with our nation's view of strategic airlift and its posture to support our current National Security Strategy with a focus on Army transformation. Transformation of our military is at the forefront of our national policy.
President Bush states in his National Security Strategy that we will, "continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results." 1 Is airlift and its use policy set to support the future of the United States military deployment and war fighting in the 21 st Century and the President's stated strategy? To answer these questions, this paper will begin with a review of airlift and force enhancers since the end of World War II. Next, it will discuss the air mobility system, to include the four tenets of airlift, sizing of the airlift force and strategic airlift customers. Following that will be a review of our current deployment challenges. Additionally, the Army's role will be discussed. They are a critical cog in the United States' ability to move the force. The Army is the largest user of airlift in any contingency. This paper will discuss briefly if their efforts at transforming to a lighter, more deployable force will relieve or stress strategic airlift. The discussion of deployment challenges will continue with others competing for lift and the current strategic fleet capability.
An analysis of the current policies will follow with possible courses of action or options. The paper will conclude with a recommendation for the future relating to the use of strategic air mobility in our transformed military.
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.
Guilio Douhet
BACKGROUND
Strategic airlift is not glamorous. As such, the emphasis in the United States Air Force has always been on missions in which things are shot or bombed. This emphasis, however, is not misplaced. Aircraft that deliver weapons on target are critical to the success of modern warfare. Airlift has always been treated as an auxiliary capability. 2 It is seen as not contributing directly to air superiority or strategic bombing. This is probably due in part to the tie to the logistical effort. The air mobility mission has been the most flexible area of air force airpower since World War II. The military is a tool to help further national defense and diplomatic objectives of its nation. Fighter and bombers are precise tools for use in limited scenarios.
Strategic airlift can be, and is, used in all scenarios across the spectrum of conflict for the daily execution of national policy. immediately sent additional C-54s to theater to help in the lift, but the most significant action taken by MATS was in who they sent. At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MATS sent the most sophisticated military airlift thinker about the role of military airlift in national defense. They sent Major General William H. Tunner, the architect of the "hump" airlift.
The first thing General Tunner did was to view the operation in Berlin and attempt to find inefficiencies in the process. Through careful airspace and time management, he was able to orchestrate the air piece of the resupply to ensure that airplanes landed in Berlin at 3 minute intervals. The next area General Tunner tackled was ground operations. He noted that while the ground crews were quick, precious time was lost while the aircrew was checking weather, in base operations, or the snack bar. He thus instituted a procedure whereby all applicable services met the airplane so the crew stayed with their aircraft the entire time it was on the ground. General Tunner also brought in time-motion experts to squeeze better turnaround time out of the ground crews. The changes instituted reduced the turnaround time of an aircraft in
Berlin from 60 minutes to 30 minutes.
6
During the entire airlift, American diplomats were working to end the blockade. 
THE CHANGING WORLD
If there is one lesson that these previous examples can teach us, it's that the United States military will always find a way to move the force in time of crisis. We will always find the more efficient way to perform a task. Whether it is time and motion studies in post World War II Berlin, air refueling to extend the range of our strategic as well as tactical aircraft, or the sheer brute force of moving people and equipment over time, the United States military has completed the mission. However, that mission is changing. We don't have the luxury of an adversary who only cuts off ground transportation or of the enemy who waits patiently for 6-months to allow us to mass combat power. Today's adversary is quick, and undefined. Anti-access and weapons of mass destruction are a concern. Our military will become more expeditionary in nature and more dependent upon responsive resupply and support.
13

THE AIR MOBILITY SYSTEM
Our present air mobility system is the product of decades of refinement. This includes doctrinal, operational, and technological innovations and advances. Post World War II development of the airlift system has been a cooperation between civil and military systems to meet the demands of our military to move around the globe. To guide military planners as to the capability and requirements of the airlift system, they have been using a standard of lift needed to move a certain number of Army divisions and Air Force squadrons a given distance over a given time. Airlift planners have progressively worked with the "closet syndrome", that is, no matter how much capability they create, there is always demand for more. Trying to figure out how much of what specific type of airlift aircraft is needed is a dynamic problem with no single solution. This is due to the ever-changing requirement. In addition, transport aircraft must always compete with other "big-ticket" items in the Air Force budget, such as fighters, bombers, and space-based systems. Generally, these other systems have had a higher priority and airlift typically gets funded when there is a major shift in requirements or the airlift fleet is decrepit.
However, the airlift fleet will never get funded to worst-case war plans.
Airlift policy is not set by any specific formula, but is a conglomeration of at least three factors; high demand, fleet structure, and budget. Since there will never be enough money to build the airlift fleet in the numbers needed to fully fulfill the requirement, the focus of airlift policy then becomes to acquire the largest and most generally capable fleet within the existing budget.
This doesn't imply that we should not study our current airlift requirements. based on low-risk requirements and can require significantly more mobility assets than are on hand or programmed. In addition, the moderate risk capability cannot handle a second, concurrent major regional contingency beginning sequentially…However, the moderate-risk requirement yields a strategically prudent force that is fiscally responsible.
18
To mitigate the risk outlined above, the United States has adopted the two near simultaneous Major Theater War (MTW) scenario. That is, one major theater war with a delay of a certain amount of time prior to an MTW in a second theater. This scenario allows for the primary use of the majority of our airlift fleet to service the first theater while ships, who do the real "heavy" lifting, are loading out and steaming to the theater. After the main effort for the first theater is promulgated, the majority of airlift can swing to service the second theater.
TENETS OF AIRLIFT POLICY
Back in the early 1930s when airlift planning was in its infancy, military and civilian planners had to reconcile the reality of low budget priorities, expensive aircraft, and high demand. They came up with four tenets of airlift that survive today.
The primary tenet of airlift for the United States is that the commercial airline fleet is the heart of the national airlift fleet. The military can never procure enough organic airlift to fill the requirement and it makes sense to partner with industry. If at all possible, cargo and personnel should be moved on civilian carriers. In the mid 1980s, MAC planners estimated that reserve airlift capacity was six to eight times less costly to maintain in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet than in the military fleet. A study by the Rand Corporation in 1990 also concluded that the costs for CRAF was a fraction of those incurred should we maintain the same capability in the organic fleet.
19 There is however a limitation to CRAF. Over the years, the Army's requirements for movement have increased exponentially, not only in total requirement, but also in over and outsized cargo. Civilian airliners simply are not built to maximize lift of this type equipment.
Most military transport aircraft are high wing, and built low to the ground, with wide fuselages.
This facilitates easier loading because the aircraft is lower to the ground. The support requirements are less and you can fit larger pieces of equipment on aircraft specifically designed for the military. On the other hand, most civilian airliners are low wing with narrow, low fuselages, and tall landing gear. What this does in essence is limit the size of individual pieces of equipment that can be loaded as well as require the support equipment to raise a load higher off the ground to get in the airliner. These are not "show-stopper" limitations, but do limit This was borne out in a Rand study following the Gulf war. The study reported that morale suffered and volunteerism fell in some CRAF companies in the face of SCUD missile attacks on Riyadh and Dhahran. 20 CRAF was established with the foundation of voluntary contracts, and it is these contracts that limit the government's ability to send civilian crews into harms way.
There have also been efforts on the military's part to better equip civilian carriers to carry the odd military loads. Congress and the military failed several times to encourage or finance the development of civil-military transports. The aforementioned design differences between pure military airlifters and civil carriers doomed any such program, however, before the program died there was procurement of 21 cargo-enhanced 747s and two DC-10s. Currently the military is pursuing another avenue to fill the void in civilian carriers of being able to carry over and outsized cargo. The USAF is lending assistance to Boeing, the maker of the C-17, in marketing the aircraft to civilian carriers. 21 If this partnership between civilian carriers and Boeing for the C-17 did take place, the USAF would gain a twofold benefit. There would be a unit cost savings on future buys and the military would have access to a civilian aircraft capable of carrying out and oversized cargo.
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The inability or inflexibility of the civil carriers to provide all required military lift prompted the second tenet of airlift policy. for civilian airliners, and missions with loads too big or bulky to be carried on airliners. Because most major war plans require these types of missions, the need for organic airlift will always be assured. However, the size and composition should be based on complementing the civilian carriers, not preempting them.
Tenet three is that the military should be equipped with aircraft specifically designed for its role. This tenet is primarily responsible for the difference in design of military transport aircraft. 
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SIZING THE FORCE
In the recent past, our policy for the sizing and structure of the mobility forces has been driven by the requirement for the 2-Major Theater War near simultaneous scenario. 25 The strategic airlift fleet was molded to cover this scenario. However, the number and scale of small-scale contingencies (SSC) throughout the 1990s highlighted a major flaw in this policy. While this gross lift capability is about the same as the C-141 it replaces, the flexibility afforded by a greater number of airframes is lost. This requires us to be extremely efficient in our use of this national resource. The problem we run into with a multiple small scale contingency type of scenario is loss of flexibility, we can't take advantage of the major hub type of operation due to the numerous and unimproved condition of the areas the contingencies fall, so we end up dispersing our fleet, thus highlighting the weakness of too few airframes. FY02  FY03  FY04  FY05  FY06  FY07  FY08  FY09  FY10  FY11  FY12  FY13  FY14  FY15  FY16  FY17  FY18  FY19 Strategically, time and space are relative, and as the history of war has shown again and again, a handful of men at a certain spot at a certain hour are frequently a far more powerful instrument of war than ten times the number on the same spot twenty-four hours later. While the idea of a lighter C-130 transportable vehicle seems to be one answer to our lack of airlift, the problem lies in that the Army will continue to have "heavy" pieces of equipment and the requirement timeline to move an Army fighting force has been accelerated. In addition, while a Stryker vehicle may fit into a C-130, because of it's weight (19 tons), it can only be moved, at best, about 600 nautical miles by a C-130. The requirement for C-17s and C-5s are still valid for the strategic movement of these vehicles. The Army's idea is to use the lighter vehicle in place of the 68-ton Abrams tank. But, the Army's transformation to a lighter, faster force means more airlift missions, not fewer. 35 According to an Army transportation officer on the Army's logistics staff, "Without increased airlift, it's going to hinder our ability to achieve the Army vision (rapid deployment)."
36
COMPETING FOR LIFT
When a commodity is scarce, there is inevitably a fight to see who gets the most and who gets it first. Airlift is no different. There is already great friction over the apportionment of lift.
Prior to the 2001Quadrennial Defense Review being published, numerous position papers were written and distributed. In one, John Kreul, an analyst with the Institute of Land Warfare complained that the Army was unfairly labeled too slow and heavy to be relevant. 37 In fact, Kreul concluded that the Air Force hogs all available lift when a crisis erupts. He says that the Air Force consumes 70% of the lift for the first 10 days. 38 This however, was not borne out during the Balkans. The Army's Task Force Hawk, a small force requiring lift from one part of Europe to another, required 542 C-17 missions. In contrast, it is expected that the deployment of an F-22 squadron with significantly greater firepower, would require only 6 C-17 missions.
39
Many other Army units, not part of the new Stryker brigades, still require a significant amount of airlift. A patriot Air Defense Battalion requires 98 C-17 missions to deploy.
The Air Force does however, require up-front lift during a contingency. Due to our policy of reduced forward presence, our enroute structure has been severely scaled back. In the first few days of a contingency, the preponderance of available lift will be busy positioning Air Force support forces forward, to include air refuelers, in order to support the deployment of follow on forces. The Air Force has been looking for ways to find efficiencies in deployments also.
General Michael Ryan, while he was Air Force Chief of Staff, reported that the Air Force had been able to reduce by 22% the number of airlift sorties required to move the Aerospace Expeditionary Force. 40 The Army and Air Force are not the only services relying on airlift. The
Marines rely on strategic airlift to move their non-expeditionary forces to the fight also. Former
Marine Corp Assistant Commandant General Terrence Dake doesn't want the Marines to be left out of the airlift puzzle. In a statement to reporters, he says that the enthusiasm for expeditionary forces is "the right thing to do for the nation," but that getting expeditionary forces out will have to be a balancing act between "expeditionary [forces] and that which is heavyhitting combat power [i.e., the Army], and all the things you bring in-between." 41 The Marines are an enabler for follow-on forces and deserve their fair share of lift too.
AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY
The United States' ability to get to and fight our nation's conflicts is heavily vested in older aircraft and one newer airframe. On the strategic airlift side, we rely on basically three airframes; the C-5, the C-141, and the C-17.
The C-5 is capable of carrying oversize and outsize cargo. The C-5 is a major player in any deployment scenario however has been plagued by low reliability rates for years. Air
Mobility Command has struggled to maintain a reliability for the C-5 above 60%. There are however, numerous upgrade programs in place to increase the reliability and push it up to the desired 75%. The major solutions for the C-5 are the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and the Re-Engining Program (RERP). The AMP will allow the C-5 to comply with global navigation requirements to allow flight in the most restrictive and most efficient airspace. The re-engining program is a comprehensive program to improve reliability, maintainability, and availability by replacing historically "bad-actor" systems with modern reliable components.
The C-17 is the nation's core airlifter and is the C-141 replacement. It has been in the inventory since 1993 and has a historically high reliability rate. The C-17 buy has recently been increased from 134 to 180, which meets the baseline for the MRS-05 study.
Air Equivalents (WBE)) in any single theater. 44 This infrastructure limitation is due to extra MHE requirements and the lack of flexibility for unimproved and short runway operations. CRAF participation in a specific theater above this level may even reduce the ability to move cargo through the theater because it would limit the organic lift's ability to move over and outsize cargo. As mentioned earlier, there are also limitations on CRAF flying some special missions and also into chemically contaminated theaters. CRAF will provide 93% of the passenger movement for the 2 nearly simultaneous MTW scenario, with a single theater requirement of Victory is the beautiful, bright colored flower. Transportation is the stem without which it could never have blossomed.
Winston Churchill
SUMMARY
Strategic air mobility plays a key role in ensuring our National Security Strategy is successful. Transportation is critical to our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations worldwide. SSCs appear likely to increase in frequency and will certainly become more challenging. 45 Sizing of our force will most assuredly be based on this premise. This raises the need for increased flexibility and numbers of airframes for our mobility forces as well as infrastructure improvements in key hubs around the world. Airlift planners have always recognized the need for a 'mixed' fleet of aircraft types and the C-17 was meant to be a swing airframe. A sort of combination strategic/tactical airlifter.
The only way to reduce the strain on our airlift system is to reduce our worldwide commitment. That is not likely to happen. The Air Mobility Command aircraft on the ground in a foreign country is as visible a sign of United States presence as a Carrier Battle Group in port, for as Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Ronald Fogleman said, "I have traveled around the world and talked to people in different countries. I can tell you that when that big "T" tail aircraft lands, with the American flag on the tail, they not only represent America -they are America."
SOLUTION FOR THE FUTURE
What to do then? There are many ideas for increasing our ability to deploy; floating islands, super-airlifters, and blimp-like airships. These are just a few of the systems being looked at in the Advanced Mobility Combat Study undertaken by the Army's Logistics
Directorate, but they are looking at the 2015 timeframe. 50 The one clear choice is to continue to funnel money to C-5 upgrade and modernization and increase the C-17 buy to 222+ airframes.
This will give us greater flexibility for the multiple SSC National policy. Another mindset shift would be in how we plan to use the C-17. When it was initially bought, it was touted as an airlifter that could move equipment from the "fort to the foxhole." In other words, cargo could be loaded at home station, and through air refueling, be delivered direct to the battlefield. A more efficient use of airlift would be to use the C-17 in a mini-strategic role. That is, use CRAF and C-5s to move as much as possible over the long strategic distance, i.e., CONUS to the Middle East, or CONUS to the Pacific. Then use the C-17 to cover the final distance direct to the battlefield. The airlift planners of the United States Air Force have relied upon four tenets for decades. Now, more than ever, is the time to adhere to those tenets. The civil sector is the backbone of our nations airlift capability, it is time to rely on them. The use of CRAF in lower levels of activation (CRAF Stage I) on a more constant basis will allow for continued refinement of the CRAF contracts as well as freeing up critical organic airlift assets to fly into unimproved or hostile areas. Another benefit of using CRAF more is the possible reduction of OPSTEMPO for our strategic airlift force. Civilian carriers doing more of the strategic lift would free up organic aircraft for maintenance, and crews for home station training (ground and flying). In the past, we have been reluctant to force the commercial sector to support our lift requirement. This has been due to the second and third order effects resulting from CRAF activation. There is a myriad of consequences for the United States associated with activating CRAF. The immediate effect is that any airframe dedicated to mobility requirements through activation is one less revenue generating airframe in the passenger system. This has tremendous economic impact on the airlines. The disruption to passenger routes would be one that would cause hardship to not only the carriers, but the U.S. public as well. This is a disruption that can be weathered for a short period of time, or for a popular contingency, but would wear thin in a protracted conflict.
There is also the possibility that if used extensively, the civilian carriers may choose to not renew their CRAF participation. These are challenges we should work aggressively to circumvent. But, this may very well be an opportunity to permanently increase CRAF participation in global strategic airlift, thus allowing them to dedicate airframes exclusively to military missions. A side benefit of this may be the procurement of additional aircraft to their fleet and another avenue of revenue, sorely needed in the airline industry downturn. In fact, we have only called upon CRAF activation once…DESERT STORM. We have relied upon volunteer participation. Civilian airliners could be used to move a bulk of the cargo to a major airport closer to the battlefield where we could cycle C-17s in a long-range tactical airlifter role or the aforementioned "mini-strat" role, thus increasing the sortie rate for the C-17. While it may seem odd for the civilian carriers to pick up a significant amount of strategic lift while our organic lift possibly reduces tempo, this would be in accordance with the 1987 National Airlift Policy which reinforced the United States military plan for using commercial airlines wherever suitable and feasible. The policy is to fly military aircraft during peacetime the minimum necessary to maintain military readiness and training and to rely on civil carriers to meet the remaining airlift requirements where possible.
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Shifting the way we think about commercial participation as well as aircraft modernization and buying more C-17s will not eliminate our airlift shortfall, but will greatly improve the scenario until we explore more unorthodox options.
It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but rather the one that is most adaptable to change.
Charles Darwin WORD COUNT = 6956
